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SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE ANALYSIS OF
REGULATORY TAKINGS IN THE REHNQUIST
COURTt
DAVID A. MYERS*
The taking issue involves the question of compensation for property
owners burdened by government regulation. The fifth amendment provides
in part that private property shall not be taken for public use, without just
compensation, and applies to the states through the fourteenth amend-
ment.1 For better or worse, the United States Supreme Court has concluded
that there is no set formula for triggering the just compensation clause,'
and admits, perhaps with some reticence, that the determination of a taking
"calls as much for the exercise of judgment as for the application of logic."3
The Court follows essentially an ad hoc approach, and the unpredictable
nature of this approach was evident in three recent highly publicized and
controversial decisions from the Court.4
In this Article, I will examine these cases to determine whether the
opinions indicate significant new criteria used by the Court to address the
compensation problem. My broader focus will be on the evolution of mod-
ern just compensation doctrine from the Burger Court to the Rehnquist
Court. Both of these goals require, as a point of departure, that the Burger
Court's most important regulatory takings decision-Penn Central Trans-
portation Co. v. New York City---be reviewed in some detail.
t 0 1989 David A. Myers. All rights reserved.
* Professor of Law, Valparaiso University. A version of this article was delivered as
an inaugural lecture on February 25, 1988, at Valparaiso University School of Law.
1. U.S. CON T. amend. V. See Chicago B. & Q.R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 235-
41 (1897).
2. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
3. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979).
4. In one opinion, the Court upheld significant limitations on coal mining in Pennsyl-
vania. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987). In a second
opinion, the Court recognized the potential for monetary damage awards as a remedy for
"temporary" regulatory takings. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v.
County of Los Angeles, 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987). In a third decision, the Court warned that
certain conditions demanded by governments as a prerequisite for permission to develop may
fail under takings analysis if there is no reasonable relationship between the effect of the devel-
opment and the conditions imposed. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141
(1987).
5. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
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I. THE Penn Central CASE
A. An Overview
In Penn Central,6 the owners of Grand Central Terminal complained
when the City of New York cut short their plans to construct an office
building above the historic landmark. The city's Landmarks Preservation
Commission concluded that any attempt to "balance a 55-story office tower
above a flamboyant Beaux-Arts facade" would reduce the landmark "to the
status of a curiosity." The owners did not respond with a less ambitious
plan; instead, they argued in court that the Landmarks Preservation Law
had taken their property without just compensation." Both state and federal
courts concluded that the law was a valid police power regulation.,
In the Supreme Court opinion, Justice Brennan, writing for the major-
ity, began his analysis with a statement that apparently draws unanimous
support: just compensation law is "designed to bar Government from forc-
ing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and
justice, should be borne by the public as a whole."' 0 He then provided a list
of factors to guide judicial effort in transforming this mandate into law.
The list is more than just a litany of prior precedent. With carefully chosen
words, Justice Brennan attempted to rechart the paths that prior opinions
have set out for the takings clause.
First, Justice Brennan suggested that takings will occur more readily
when the interference can be characterized as a "physical invasion" by the
government.' To illustrate, the Court cited United States v. Causby,2
where flights by army aircraft over a farmer's land were so low and fre-
quent that they caused a direct interference with property rights compensa-
ble under law."3 The glide path rules established by public regulation were
characterized as an exercise of the power of eminent domain. In essence,
the federal government had purchased a flight easement over the farmer's
6. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
7. Id. at 117-18.
8. Id. at 118-19.
9. Id. at 138; Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 42 N.Y.2d 324, 366 N.E.2d
1271, 397 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1977). For a review of the state court opinion, see Costonis, The
Disparity Issue: A Context for the Grand Central Terminal Decision, 91 HARV. L. REV. 402
(1977).
10. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 123. The passage originated in Armstrong v.
United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). For a prophetic view that this statement signaled the
Court's acceptance of "compensable takings," see Beuscher, Some Tentative Notes on the
Integration of Police Power and Eminent Domain by the Courts: So-called Inverse or Reverse
Condemnation, 1968 Urb. L. Ann. 11.
11. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124.
12. 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
13. Id. at 266-67.
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Justice Brennan then attempted to refine this concept by contrasting it
with other government activities. "A 'taking' may more readily be found
when the interference with property can be characterized as a physical in-
vasion by Government . . .than when interference arises from some public
program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the
common good."' 5 The juxtaposition of these two factors resembles an ap-
proach to the taking issue suggested by Professor Sax.'6 Sax argued that
governmental activity can be classified according to its purpose: in many
instances, government works to enhance the economic value of its resources;
in other circumstances, government acts to improve the public condition by
resolving conflicts between competing private economic claims." Local ordi-
nances designed to abate or forestall private nuisances exemplify the latter
category, and for these activities, no compensation is required.' 8 The over-
flight cases provide an example of government acting in its enterprise ca-
pacity, and in these circumstances, compensation must be paid.' 9
To be sure, the passage quoted above does not suggest that the Court
embraced the Sax "enterprise" theory as the touchstone of the takings
question. But it does signal some sympathy toward the notion that govern-
ment can be tested more stringently under the fifth amendment for certain
categories of activity. If the public program simply calibrates the "benefits
and burdens of economic life" between individuals or groups in order to
further the common good, the Court will less readily intervene.20 But where
government actions "may be characterized as acquisitions of resources to
permit or facilitate uniquely public functions," the Court will call it a tak-
ing.2" Significantly, the Court cited both Causby and the Sax article in sup-
port of its rules.22
14. Id. at 267. See generally Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny County in Perspective:
Thirty Years of Supreme Court Expropriation Law, 1962 Sup. CT. REv. 63, 82-90.
15. Penn Cent. Trans. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
16. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964).
17. Id. at 62-63.
18. Id. at 69. Sax cites as examples Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590
(1962), and Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 57 Cal. 2d 515, 370 P.2d
342, 20 Cal. Rptr. 638, appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 36 (1962).
19. Sax, supra note 16, at 68-69.
20. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). Accord
Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979).
21. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 128.
22. Id. The Court listed three other cases supporting compensation for "invasions" of
this sort, Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962) (overflights); Portsmouth Co. v.
United States, 260 U.S. 327 (1922) (gunfire over claimant's land); and United States v. Cress,
243 U.S. 316 (1917) (floodings). The Court also cited, but failed to distinguish, another case
denying compensation for damages caused to a building occupied by federal troops and be-
sieged by rioters. YMCA v. United States, 395 U.S. 85 (1969).
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Justice Rehnquist, in dissent, took a more traditional view of the
"physical invasion" theory.28 Prior to enactment of the landmarks law, he
noted, Penn Central could have used its "air rights" to build an office build-
ing."' The Commission's decision, however, effectively prohibited any in-
crease in the height of the terminal.2 5 Penn Central is therefore being de-
prived of its liberty to exploit its "air rights," a property interest protected
by law.26 Conversely, the city has acquired this interest, "a nonconsensual
servitude not borne by any neighboring or similar properties."2' He also
cited Causby in support of his analysis.28
Justice Brennan's response to this argument surfaces in his point-and-
counterpoint rejection of the assertions made by the petitioner, Penn Cen-
tral. He labeled "untenable" any argument that a taking can be established
by the mere fact that a landowner is denied the opportunity to exploit a
property interest.2 9 "'Taking' jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel
into discrete segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a partic-
ular segment have been entirely abrogated."30 Instead, he asserted, the
Court must focus both on the character of the action and the impact of the
law on the property considered as a whole."' He noted that unlike the pub-
lic regulation in Causby (which destroyed the use of a farm), the landmarks
law does not impair the present use of the terminal.3 2 More significantly,
perhaps, Justice Brennan concluded that unlike the acquisition of the servi-
tude in Causby (which was accompanied by the actual possession and use
of the airspace by government aircraft), the landmarks law neither "facili-
tates nor arises from any entrepreneurial operation of the city."3 In sum,
the majority concluded that the historic landmarks law is different both in
kind and degree from prior "physical appropriation" cases.
Thus, an important factor for courts to consider under the analysis in
Penn Central is the nature of the activity on the regulated land. Govern-
ment can prohibit a beneficial use of property to the point of causing sub-
stantial individualized harm so long as the restriction is reasonably related
to a policy "expected to produce a widespread public benefit and applicable
23. The traditional view is discussed in Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness:
Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1165,
1184-90 (1967); and Sax, supra note 16, at 46-48, 67-68.
24. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 142 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).'
25. Id. at 142, 143 n.5.
26. Id. at 143.
27. Id.
28. Id. at n.5.
29. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130 (1978).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 130-31.
32. Id. at 135.
33. Id.
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to all similarly situated property. ' 34 The Court referred to three cases to
support this rule. The first is Miller v. Schoene3 where a state statute au-
thorized public officials to order the destruction of ornamental red cedar
trees hosting a disease known as cedar rust, which might infect and destroy
nearby apple orchards. The second case, Hadachek v. Sebastian,8 upheld a
city ordinance prohibiting the owner of a brickyard from operating his busi-
ness in a residential community. The third opinion, Goldblatt v. Hemp-
stead,3 7 upheld a local ordinance that effectively prohibited the owner of a
sand and gravel mining business from continuing his operation by banning
any excavation below the city's water table.
The Court's characterization of these three cases is significant. Justice
Brennan was extremely careful in defining the underlying rational of the
various opinions. He expressly rejected the notion that in each case the gov-
ernment was prohibiting a "noxious" use of land and that this fact serves as
justification for denying compensation.38 Instead, he asserted that the Court
was simply upholding a legislative determination of a preferred use between
competing claimants. In Miller, for example, Justice Brennan argued that
the Court was merely upholding the choice made by the state to destroy one
class of property "in order to save another which, in the judgment of the
legislature, is of greater value to the public."3 9 Similarly, in Hadacheck, the
local legislature was confronted with two inconsistent uses (a brickyard and
a residential development); its decision to give preference to the latter was
reasonable and, therefore, within constitutional parameters.4 0 For Justice
Brennan, then, the important point is not that the regulated land use can be
characterized as "harmful," but that the use has become inconsistent with a
reasonable legislative determination of the public interest.41
Justice Rehnquist, again, took a more traditional view4 2 of these prior
decisions. He asserted that the decisions allowed government to prevent a
property owner from using his property "to injure others without having to
compensate the owner for the value of the forbidden use."'43 But he con-
cluded that Penn Central's proposed structure would not harm surrounding
34. Id. at 134 n.30.
35. 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
36. 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
37. 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
38. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 134 n.30 (1978).
39. Id. at 126 (quoting Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 279 (1928)).
40. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 126.
41. Id. at 133-34 n.30. See also Sax, supra note 16, at 53 ("[T]he typical taking cases
[involve] uses which have become inconsistent with the legislatively declared public interest.").
42. See generally Developments in the Law - Zoning, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1427, 1470-73
(1978).
43. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 144 (1978) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting).
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land owners. The addition, he noted, would comply with applicable health
and safety regulations, including zoning laws.4 Consequently, the city is
not acting to prevent a nuisance, but instead is forcing the company to pre-
serve the landmark "for the benefit of sightseeing New Yorkers and
tourists." '
This distinction, which requires compensation when the state restricts
property rights in order to obtain a public benefit but does not require pay-
ment where the restriction is designed to prevent landowners from imposing
external harm upon others, has proved a resilient approach to the taking
issue.46 Professor Dunham wrote persuasively on the utility of such a test,
and his writings 7 provide an appropriate lens for viewing the Rehnquist
approach.
Dunham asserts that the common law allows for government to make a
nuisance-like activity assume the burdens or costs which that activity may
cause.48 This, in turn, forces the activity to internalize these burdens as a
cost of doing business.49 He then adds:
But to compel a particular owner to undertake an activity to
benefit the public, even if in the form of a restriction, is to com-
pel one person to assume the cost of a benefit conferred on
others without hope for recoupment of the cost. An owner is
compelled to furnish a public benefit just as much when his land
is taken for the runway of an airport as when he is prevented
from building upon his land so that airplanes may approach the
runway. In the former the landowner is paid without question; in
the latter there is an attempt from time to time to compel the
landowner to furnish the easement of flight without compensa-
tion by restricting building. The evil of the latter system is that
44. Id. at 146.
45. Id.
46. See R. ELLICKSON & A. TARLOCK, LAND USE CONTROLS: CASES AND MATERIALS
136 (1981). The distinction was first given eloquent form by Professor Freund in his treatise
on governmental authority and constitutional rights. E. FREUND, THE POLICE POWER 546-47
(1904).
47. See, e.g., Dunham, A Legal and Economic Basis for City Planning, 58 COLUM. L.
REV. 650 (1958); Dunham, Property, City Planning, and Liberty, in LAW AND LAND 28 (C.
Hhar ed. 1964); Dunham, Flood Control via the Police Power, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 1098
(1959).
48. Dunham, A Legal and Economic Basis for City Planning, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 650,
665 (1958).
49. Id. Professor Dunham explains:
All this means is that an activity declared to be a nuisance to the adjacent properties
must purchase the right to damage the neighboring lands or must move elsewhere to a
location which is by hypothesis less efficient and economical; or it must install expensive
equipment and change the mode of operation so as to eliminate the external harm.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 23, No. 3 [1989], Art. 8
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there is no approximation of equal sharing of cost or of sharing
according to capacity to pay as there is where a public benefit is
obtained by subsidy or expenditure of public funds. The accident
of ownership of a particular location determines the persons in
the community bearing the cost of increasing the general wel-
fare. A further consequence of an attempt to obtain a benefit by
means of a restriction is that the full cost of the public benefit is
thereby concealed from those in our democratic society who are
given the power of deciding whether or not they want to obtain a
benefit.50
Although both kinds of restrictions ultimately do result in some incre-
ment of general welfare, Professor Dunham argues that there is an impor-
tant practical difference in their consequences. The attempt to obtain a ben-
efit usually requires that the landowner engage in certain designated
permitted uses. 5' The effort to eliminate a harm, on the other hand, prohib-
its some uses but allows for private choice to determine which remaining
uses should be made of the land.52 Of course, the most crucial question
under such an analysis is the threshold characterization of the restriction. 51
Difficult though this may be, Professor Dunham suggests that the courts,
not the legislatures, must decide whether prevention of harm is the objec-
tive of the law.54
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 664.
53. Therein lies the rub for most commentators critical of the harm-prevention/benefit
extraction approach to takings cases. See, e.g., Heyman & Gilhool, The Constitutionality of
Imposing Increased Community Costs on New Suburban Residents Through Subdivision Ex-
actions, 73 YALE L.J. 1119, 1128 (1964).
The distinction between burden and benefit is, however, very difficult to make .... Con-
sider, for instance, height and use limitations imposed on land surrounding an airport to
facilitate the airport's safe operation. Should such zoning be viewed as preventing harms
to the successful operation of the adjoining land use or should it be viewed as creating a
public benefit? Industrial-only zoning is viewed by Dunham as benefit inducing; yet the
cases are nearly unanimous in upholding the device. In fact, Dunham's analysis leads to
no sure result in evaluating the host of land regulations, including setbacks and conven-
tional zoning, which can be conceptualized both as harm preventing and as benefit
inducing.
Id. (footnotes omitted). See also Sax, supra note 16, at 49 ("Actually the problem is not one
of noxiousnous or harm-creating activity at all; rather it is a problem of inconsistency between
perfectly innocent and independently desirable uses."). Further difficulties with the general
approach are explored in Michelman, supra note 23, at 1196-1201.
54. Dunham, Flood Control via the Police Power, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 1098, 1124
(1959) ("An assertion by the legislature that such is its objective is not enough; the court must
analyze the law and determine this for itself.") (footnote omitted). Professor Dunham appar-
ently concedes the difficulties involved in classifying public measures as either preventing
harms or providing benefits. See Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Le-
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Justice Rehnquist utilized this approach to conclude that the
Landmarks Preservation Commission was forcing Penn Central to provide a
public amenity without paying for the benefit. He maintained that the
Commission's actions "do not merely prohibit Penn Central from using its
property in a narrow set of noxious ways."'55 Instead, he categorized the
impact of the landmarks law as one placing "an affirmative duty on Penn
Central to maintain the Terminal in its present state and in 'good re-
pair.'""" As a result, Justice Rehnquist asserted, the company is not al-
lowed to use its property according to choice within a range of permissible
uses; rather, it is required to maintain the building and thus preserve part
of the city's cultural heritage.57 That, he concluded, is the kind of obligation
that the city can exact only if it is willing to pay a just price.58
By way of contrast, Justice Brennan believes (apparently) that courts
cannot, and perhaps should not, attempt to draw such distinctions. As noted
previously, he asks only whether the legislative program reasonably imple-
ments a policy expected to produce widespread public benefits. 59 As one
commentator has concluded, Justice Brennan "appears to assimilate bene-
fits to harms in [his] reasoning that [any] land use that frustrates a legisla-
tively declared public purpose is a 'harm,' whether or not the use is harmful
or benign considered independently of that purpose."8 0 This position is re-
sponsive to those critics who reject the harm-benefit dichotomy because it
cannot be determined which landowner is causing harm to another. 61 More-
over, this position is consistent with Justice Brennan's general rule that tak-
ings are rare when government is merely adjusting "the benefits and bur-
dens of economic life to promote the common good. 18 2 But it also raises a
further question for the Court to address (and one that may be just as
elusive as the benefit-harm distinction): By what criteria should the Court
test the reasonableness of legislative judgments concerning the use of land?
Justice Brennan offered three suggestions to this inquiry at various
gal Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 385, 422 (1977).




58. Id. at 153.
59. See supra text accompanying notes 34-41.
60. Costonis, Law and Aesthetics: A Critique and a Reformulation of the Dilemmas,
80 MICH. L. REV. 355, 458 n.385 (1982).
61. See authorities cited supra note 53. But see also Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning:
Convenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. Cm. L. REV. 681, 728-
33 (1973) (defending the distinction and providing a test for determining between "harmful"
and "beneficial" uses); Tarlock, Regulatory Takings, 60 CH.[-]KENT L. REv. 23, 37 (1984)
(". . .at the present time the harm-benefit test offers the best hope, despite all the difficulties
of its application, of making sense out of the cases.").
62. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
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points in his opinion. First, the use restrictions must be "reasonably neces-
sary to the effectuation of a substantial public purpose."63 Second, the re-
strictions must be applicable to all similarly situated property." Third, the
restrictions must not have an unduly harsh impact upon the owner's use of
property.65 This last rule introduces an additional factor in the Court's tak-
ings analysis-the severity of the impact of the law on affected landowners.
Up to this point, we have seen that the majority of the Court, speaking
through Justice Brennan, has taken an exceedingly deferential approach to
legislative restrictions on land use. The presumption seems quite formidably
to favor the state. A landowner will not prevail unless he can marshall facts
to show either that the action is patently arbitrary and unreasonable or that
the state secretly covets his resources to "facilitate uniquely public func-
tions." 66 The one exception to all of this is the Court's conclusion that per-
fectly legitimate public policies may nevertheless interfere so severely with
"distinct investment-backed expectations" of individual landowners that
compensation will be required to sustain the law.67
The genesis of this rule is Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon. 8 In that
case, the state legislature passed a law prohibiting any mining of anthracite
coal in ways that would cause the subsidence of public structures or private
residences.69 The Mahons sought an injunction to prevent the coal company
from mining on their land. They had purchased the property from Pennsyl-
vania Coal, but the company had reserved the right to remove coal without
liability to the surface owners. Because the statute effectively prevented the
company from exercising that right, the Court considered Pennsylvania
Coal's defense to be a direct challenge to the scope of a legitimate exercise
of the police power.7 1
Justice Holmes, writing for the majority, was willing to assume that
the legislation advanced important public policies. 71 Even so, the Court con-
cluded that the fifth amendment sets a limit on the extent to which public
63. Id. at 127 (citing Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928)). Signifi-
cantly, Justice Brennan includes within this category land use regulations such as zoning
which prohibit contemplated, as well as existing, uses of land. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438
U.S. at 125.
64. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 134, n.30.
65. Id. at 127 (citing Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) and Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922)).
66. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 128.
67. Id. at 127.
68. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
69. Id. at 412.
70. Id. at 413. ("As applied to this case the statute is admitted to destroy previously
existing rights of property and contract. The question is whether the police power can be
stretched so far.").
71. Id. at 418.
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necessity can frustrate private property expectations." "The general rule at
least is, that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regula-
tion goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.173 The Court provided no
guidelines for establishing threshold levels of regulatory legitimacy, but it
indicated that judges would have to weigh the public interest against the
harm resulting to individuals. 4 The question depends upon the particular
facts, the Court concluded,7 5 and in this case "the act cannot be sustained
as an exercise of the police power, so far as it affects the mining of coal
under streets or cities in places where the right to mine such coal has been
reserved."178
This carefully restricted holding has subsequently given way to the ex-
pansive language of the rules that produced it.77 In Penn Central, for exam-
ple, Justice Brennan cites the case for the general proposition that "a state
statute that substantially furthers important public policies may so frustrate
distinct investment-backed expectations as to amount to a 'taking.' "78 The
Court determined first that the landmarks law was a legitimate exercise of
the police power.79 It then tested the law further by focusing on the stat-
ute's interference with the company's property expectations.8 0 The Court
concluded that the law did not affect a taking because (1) Penn Central's
"primary expectation" concerning the use of the parcel as a terminal was
unimpaired;81 (2) the company could still seek approval for a less ambitious
construction project; 82 and (3) Penn Central could transfer some develop-
ment rights to nearby properties.8 3
Justice Rehnquist agreed with the general notion that otherwise legiti-
mate police power measures may nevertheless require compensation if they
deny to landowners a reasonable return on investment. 8 ' But he insisted
that the corollary is not true: "A taking does not become a noncompensable
72. Id. at 413.
73. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
74. Id. at 413-14.
75. Id. at 413.
76. Id. at 414.
77. See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 510, 594 (1962) (regulatory
actions can be "so onerous as to constitute a taking which constitutionally requires compensa-
tion." (citing Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922))).
78. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 127 (1978). Justice Bren-
nan's interpretation of Pennsylvania Coal is more fully developed in San Diego Gas & Elec.
Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 649-50 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
79. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 128-35.
80. Id. at 136.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 136-37.
83. Id. at 137.
84. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 149 (1978) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting).
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exercise of police power simply because the government in its grace allows
the owner to make some 'reasonable' use of his property." 85 Regulations
which destroy property expectations may nevertheless become "noncompen-
sable" if the prohibition involves noxious uses,"8 but he did not consider the
landmarks law to fall within that category.87 Even regulations which pro-
hibit noninjurious uses can become "noncompensable" if the prohibition ap-
plies over a broad cross-section of land and burdens are therefore evenly
shared. 8 Zoning, for example, can elude the compensation requirement be-
cause "the burden is shared relatively evenly and it is reasonable to con-
clude that on the whole an individual who is harmed by one aspect of zon-
ing will be benefitted by another." 89 Justice Rehnquist concluded, however,
that unlike zoning the landmarks law fails to secure such an average reci-
procity of advantage because it parcels out the benefits and burdens to sep-
arate classes-historic landmark owners bear the costs of preservation;
"sightseeing New Yorkers and tourists" enjoy the benefits.8 0
Justice Brennan apparently agrees that the risk of arbitrariness and
the need for compensation are both reduced when community-wide regula-
tions provide evidence of reciprocal burdens and benefits.91 But he did not
agree that Penn Central was "solely burdened and unbenefited" by the
landmarks legislation. 2 He noted that the law applied to a large number of
parcels throughout the city.9 3 More importantly, perhaps, he was unwilling
to second-guess the city council's determination that the legislation bene-
fited all New York citizens, including landmark owners. 9' Justice Brennan
conceded that the corporate owner is more burdened than benefited by the
law, but he compared its fate to the brickyard owner in Hadachek, the
cedar tree grower in Miller, and the gravel mine operator in Goldblatt.95 In
each instance, he concluded, the restrictions were reasonably related to im-
portant public policies, and that determination marks the end to the Court's
inquiry.9
B. A Critique
These divergent approaches to the taking issue reveal basic differences
85. Id.
86. Id. at 144-45.
87. Id. at 145-46.
88. Id. at 147.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 146, 147-49.
91. Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 135 n.32 (1978).
92. Id. at 134.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 134-35.
95. Id. at 135.
96. Id. at 133-34 n.30.
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of opinion as to the mischief that the takings clause is designed to prevent.
In Penn Central, Justice Rehnquist primarily viewed the provision as pro-
tection against unreasonable interferences with private property expecta-
tions. The focus here is predominantly on the impact of the law from the
vantage point of the affected landowner. Justice Brennan primarily inter-
preted the provision as a guard against appropriation of property by collec-
tive action to further public objectives in arbitrary or unjust ways. This
focus is predominantly on the nature of the government activity under re-
view, although not exclusively so.
With such a divergence in premises, however, what is perhaps most
surprising about this reconstructed dialogue between Justices Brennan and
Rehnquist is that it reveals substantial agreement among the members of
the Burger Court on the nature of the questions that need to be addressed
in order to resolve a takings case. For example, both the majority and the
dissenters in Penn Central agreed that the fifth amendment operates in part
to insulate landowners from uncompensated public acquisitions of private
resources. The majority asked whether the contested activity can be charac-
terized as an acquisition of resources to facilitate uniquely public func-
tions. 97 The dissenters asked whether the action results in a physical appro-
priation of protected property interests, such as air rights.98 Similarly, both
factions agreed that some government restrictions can elude the compensa-
tion requirement even though property expectations are adversely affected.
The majority asked whether the restriction is reasonably related to a gov-
ernment program expected to produce widespread public benefits and equi-
tably applied; if so, no taking occurs.99 The dissenters would come to a
similar conclusion if the regulated use is a noxious one or if the prohibition
applies over a broad cross-section of land and evidences some average reci-
procity of advantage among landowners. °00 All members of the Court also
seemed to agree that the takings clause should protect individuals from any
regulation so severe in its economic impact that fairness demands judicial
intervention. The majority asked whether the law unduly frustrates distinct
investment-backed expectations.' The dissenters asked whether the law
denies to landowners the reasonable use of their property. 102 The answers to
these various questions will of course depend upon the unique and individ-
ual circumstaices of each separate case. 03
97. Id. at 128.
98. Id. at 142-43 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
99. Penn Cent. Trans. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 133-34 n.30 (1978).
100. Id. at 144-50 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 124, 127.
102. Id. at 149 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 124. See also Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 261 (1980) ("[T]he
question necessarily requires a weighing of private and public interests.").
[Vol. 23
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In other words, there appears to be tacit agreement among the mem-
bers of the Court on several basic tests for regulatory takings: the physical
appropriation test, the harm-benefit distinction and, to a lesser extent, the
noxious use test, and the governmental enterprise-arbitration theory. But
unfortunately, each test can only provide at most a useful approach to a
narrow range of takings cases.' 04 They are all inadequate insofar as they
fail to provide a realistic solution for problems resulting from the entire
spectrum of activities that contemporary governments undertake.
Take, for example, the physical appropriation test. This approach holds
that a taking may more readily be discerned when governments are actually
acquiring resources to enhance public functions. 105 The rule works well in
those cases of "institutional aggrandizement,' 0 6 such as the overflight
cases, 07 where governments thwart private property expectations in order
to facilitate public projects. In this context, the rule serves two legitimate
functions. First, it provides compensation to landowners anxious about the
fact that extremely basic values of ownership-possession and exclusiv-
ity-have been sacrificed to the public weal.' 08 Second, it forces the body
104. See Michelman, supra note 23, at 1183-1201. See generally Van Alstyne, Taking
or Damaging by Police Power: The Search For Inverse Condemnation Criteria, 44 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1 (1970).
105. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 458 U.S. 104, 128 (1978).
106. The phrase is Professor Ackerman's. B. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE
CONSTITUTION 53 (1977).
107. See, e.g., Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962); United States v.
Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
108. Freeman, Give and Take: Distributing Local Environmental Control Through
Land Use Regulation, 60 MINN. L. REV. 883, 928-29 (1976). See also Michelman, supra note
23, at 1228 ("The psychological shock, the emotional protest, the symbolic threat to all prop-
erty and security, may be expected to reach their highest pitch when government is an un-
abashed invader.").
The Court reconfirmed these values of the takings clause by adopting a per se rule for
permanent physical appropriations in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458
U.S. 419 (1982). There the Court held that any permanent physical occupation of property
results in a taking to the extent of the occupation, without regard to whether the action
achieves an important public benefit or has only minimal economic impact on the owner. The
Court explained the reasoning for its holding in the following manner:
Property rights in a physical thing have been described as the rights to "possess, use and
dispose of it." United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945). To the
extent that the government permanently occupies physical property, it effectively destroys
each of these rights. First, the owner has no right to possess the occupied space himself,
and also has no power to exclude the occupier from possession and use of the space. The
power to exclude has traditionally been considered one of the most treasured strands in
an owner's bundle of property rights. [citations omitted] Second, the permanent physical
occupation of property forever denies the owner any power to control the use of the prop-
erty; he not only cannot exclude others, but can make no nonpossessory use of the prop-
erty. Although deprivation of the right to use and obtain a profit from property is not, in
every case, independently sufficient to establish a taking, [citation omitted] it is clearly
relevant. Finally, even though the owner may retain the bare legal right to dispose of the
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politic to reconsider the efficacy of its determination to go forward with the
project under consideration. 109 But the rule seems to spend itself analyti-
cally with those circumstances in which a transfer of resources can legiti-
mately be detected. It provides no guidance for the variety of takings cases
falling outside this parameter. As Professor Michelman aptly observed, "A
physical invasion test, then, can never be more than a convenience for iden-
tifying clearly compensable occasions. It cannot justify dismissal of any oc-
casion as clearly noncompensable.""10
The noxious use test suffers a similar deficiency. To the extent that we
can provide a defensible classification of "harms,""' the rule works well in
those situations where the legislature reasonably concludes that nuisance-
like activities must be curbed. 12 It serves to quiet citizen unrest by insulat-
ing neighbors from unneighborly conduct."" But the rule provides no in-
sights for the significant number of takings cases that involve considerations
transcending essentially localized conflicts. 1 4 To paraphrase Professor
Michelman," 5 the noxious use test can never be more than a convenience
for identifying clearly noncompensable exercises of the police power; it can-
not justify dismissal of any such exercise as clearly compensable.
Similar difficulties confront those tests which attempt to transform the
discriminants discussed above into a more sophisticated compensation prac-
tice, namely, the harm/benefit distinction proposed by Professor Dunham" 6
and the governmental enterprise/arbitration theory, proffered by Professor
Sax.1 7 These theories work well when government is engaged in an activity
occupied space by transfer or sale, the permanent occupation of that space by a stranger
will ordinarily empty the right of any value, since the purchaser will also be unable to
make any use of the property.
Id. at 435-36 (footnote omitted). The rule in Loretto seems to have become a central tenet in
the Court's takings analysis, see, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictus, 480
U.S. 470, 489 n.18 (1987), despite trenchant criticism by commentators. See Costonis, Pre-
sumptive and Per Se Takings: A Decisional Model for the Taking Issue, 58 N.Y.U.L. REV.
465 passim (1983); Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the Juris-
prudence of Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1667 passim (1988).
109. See B. ACKERMAN, supra note 106, at 51; Dunham, A Legal and Economic Basis
For City Planning, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 650, 665 (1958).
110. Michelman, supra note 23, at 1228 (emphasis in original).
111. See supra note 53.
112. See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); Miller v. Schoene, 276
U.S. 272 (1928); and Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915). As mentioned previously,
the majority of the Court in Penn Central chose not to categorize these cases as noxious use
cases, but instead considered them reasonable restrictions related to policies expected to pro-
duce widespread public benefits. See supra text accompanying notes 34-41.
113. See Ellickson, supra note 61, at 724-33.
114. See generally Freeman, supra note 108, at 936-51.
115. See supra text accompanying note 110.
116. See supra text accompanying notes 48-54.
117. See supra text accompanying notes 17-19.
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that falls clearly within either of the established classifications.' 18 In these
instances, both theories serve to foster a sense of certainty and concreteness
in the difficult judicial task at hand. They also serve to inculcate basic eco-
nomic nuances (primarily utilitarian conventions) in the development of a
consistent compensation theory."19 But these approaches falter when con-
fronted with activities which defy convenient pigionholing. For example,
set-back regulations, height limitations and even conventional zoning can
all be viewed as nuisance-preventing government arbitration. 1 0 But these
same regulations, particularly in view of their prospective application,' 2'
also add to the public weal various identifiable amenities, or benefits, such
as broad streets, attractive skylines and well-planned communities. For
these circumstances, the harm-benefit approaches seem inherently arbitrary
when they are asked to provide a definitive answer to a particular case. 22
The diminution-in-value test as currently applied is an exception to the
assertion that existing takings criteria are underinclusive determinants. Ex-
cept in cases involving permanent physical appropriations, the rule is now
applied across the board; otherwise legitimate exercises of the police power
will fall under the fifth amendment proscription if the regulation goes too
far. 23 The test serves to promote efficiency124 and to protect landowners
deprived of "some distinctly perceived, sharply crystallized, investment-
backed expectation." " 5 But the test raises a number of questions that are
difficult for courts to address.'26 For example, how severe does the economic
impact have to be in order to consider the regulation unconstitutionally am-
bitious? And what constitutes "property" for purposes of the test? In Penn-
sylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, the Court focused solely on subsurface rights
in order to gauge impairment of value, 27 while in Penn Central, the Court
refused to separate air rights from the surface estate in order to calculate
the degree of interference with property expectations held by the landmark
owner. 128 The factual differences in these two cases do not clearly support
such different results.
118. For example, the overflight cases can easily be classified as benefit-producing or
public enterprise-enhancing activities.
119. See B. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 50-54 (1977) (dis-
cussing Sax's theory); Ellickson, supra note 54, at 420-21 (discussing Dunham's theory).
120. See Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603 (1927); Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91 (1909);
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 366 (1926).
121.. See Freeman, supra note 108, at 940.
122. See Heyman & Gilhool, supra note 53, at 1128.
123. See supra text accompanying notes 67-83.
124. See Ellickson, supra note 54, at 420-21.
125. Michelman, supra note 23, at 1233.
126. See generally Sax, supra note 16, at 60.
127. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414 (1922).
128. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1977).
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Yet even more problematic is the uncertain manner in which these va-
rious tests are supposed to fit together. For me, the structure of the major-
ity opinion in Penn Central has always been confusing. The opinion begins
in Section IIA129 with an overview of the various "takings" determinants.
In Section IIB130 of the opinion, the focus of the Court was primarily on the
nature of the activity under review. If the interference with property inter-
ests can be characterized as an acquisition of resources to facilitate public
functions, the action is simply an exercise of the power of eminent domain,
a "taking." But if the legislative act promotes the general welfare by
prohibiting particular uses of the land, the Court will uphold the regulation
as a legitimate police power measure. But even here, as the Court pointed
out in section IIC of its opinion,'' if this legislative act unduly deprives the
owner of his economic interest in the property, then the Court will say a
"taking" has occurred and we are back within the sphere of the eminent
domain power.
At a general level of abstraction, the Court's approach is difficult to
visualize in some coherent manner. Now I realize that Justice Brennan was
attempting to enunciate principles which would explain the whole pattern of
past takings cases-an effort that has been likened to a connect-the-dots
exercise. 132 But unfortunately the picture that emerges is not unlike one of
the optical illusions in an M.C. Escher print-like the triangle composed of
straight beams which are connected by three right angles:133 We begin by
focusing on the nature of the power imposed to see if it is merely a dis-
guised exercise of eminent domain. If not, we turn to an analysis of legiti-
mate purposes to determine if the exercise of police power is a reasonable
one. But even assuming that it is, we then turn once again to determine if
the state has gone "too far" and reentered the realm of eminent domain.
Those who are able to explain such things as the Escherian triangle tell us
that the effect is produced by an "ingenious linkage of different spatial real-
ities.' 3 4 If one focuses on each separate link, the image is logical; there is
no error in any component part. But when looked at together, the whole is,
in a word, impossible. 35 That may be as well an apt description of the
129. Id. at 123-28.
130. Id. at 128-35.
131. Id. at 135-38.
132. Ely, Foreword: On Discovering Fundamental Values, 92 HARV. L. REV. 5, 32
(1978).
133. The print entitled "The Waterfall," which uses this optical illusion, can be found in
THE WORLD OF M.C. ESCHER (J.L. Locher ed. 1971) at cat. 258.
134. Locher, The Work of M.C. Escher in THE WORLD OF M.C. ESCHER 7, 17 (J.L.
Locher ed. 1971).
135. Id. at 17-18. As Escher himself explained, "If we follow the various parts of this
construction one by one we are unable to discover any mistake in it. Yet it is an impossible
whole because changes suddenly occur in the interpretation of distance between our eye and
the object." M.C. EsCHER, THE GRAPHIC WORK OF M.C. ESCHER 22 (rev. ed. 1984).
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Court's attempt in Penn Central to reconcile past decisions which have ad-
dressed the tensions between police power activities and eminent domain
limitations. The opinion was, in any event, the legacy of the Burger Court
in the law of regulatory takings.
II. REGULATORY TAKINGS IN THE REHNQUIST COURT
A. An Overview
The various "images" of the Penn Central case were perhaps most
prominent in the first important takings decision in the Court's 1986-87
term, Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis.3 6 The Penn-
sylvania legislature enacted a law prohibiting coal mining that causes subsi-
dence damage to surface structures. Under the law, the Pennsylvania De-
partment of Environmental Resources (DER) typically requires 50% of the
coal beneath such structures to be kept in place as a means of providing
surface support.13 7 The petitioners asserted that the law amounted to a tak-
ing of their property because it effectively requires coal companies through-
out the state to leave 27 million tons of coal in the ground. 38
In a case that is thus remarkably similar to Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon,13 9 the Court in Keystone held that the state was acting pursuant to
a perfectly legitimate, traditional police power objective., 0 The dominant
focus of the majority opinion, written by Justice Stevens, was on the nature
of the state's interest in the regulation."' The public interest in preventing
activities similar to public nuisances is a substantial one, and Justice Ste-
vens hinted that this factor alone might justify the state's intervention in
this matter."42
But the Court also considered an impact analysis."4 It rejected the
petitioners' attempt to narrowly define and segment their property in order
to assert a substantial deprivation. The Court held that the 27 million tons
of coal left in place do not constitute a separate segment of property for
takings law purposes. 44 Thus, the limitation on property rights here in-
volves only one "strand" in the petitioners' bundle of property rights and it
is not significant enough to conclude that a taking has occurred."5
136. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
137. Id. at 477.
138. Id. at 498.
139. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
140. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 488 (1987).
141. Id. at 488-93.
142. Id. at 492.
143. Id. at 493-502.
144. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 498 (1987).
145. Id. at 497 (quoting Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979): "[W]here an
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In his dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist focused predomi-
nantly on what he considers the relevant perspective-that of the property
owner. 4" From this perspective, an identifiable segment of property (the 27
million tons of coal in place) has been completely destroyed by the govern-
ment regulation. Moreover, much of this coal in place is a unit of property
separately recognized by Pennsylvania as a support estate and utilized by
buyers and sellers in the state as the basis for bargained-for exchanges.4
The restriction on mining this coal constitutes a complete interference with
this property right and thus extinguishes its value. This, the Chief Justice
concluded, must be accompanied by just compensation. 148
Perhaps even more enlightening is the Chief Justice's conclusion that
he could not see "how the label placed on the government's action is rele-
vant to consideration of its impact on property rights. 1 49 This would seem
to indicate that Chief Justice Rehnquist is willing to focus only on the de-
gree of interference with established expectations protected under state
property law. Nevertheless, the Chief Justice concluded that this statute is
not the type of regulation that would satisfy the nuisance exception to tak-
ings analysis. Although the legislature was motivated in part by a concern
for public safety, the Chief Justice considered the statute as a regulation
based essentially on economic concerns: preservation of existing buildings,
economic development, and maintenance of property values to preserve the
state's tax base. In his estimation, these purposes should not find shelter
under the "nuisance" rational for "noncompensatory" regulations. 5
Chief Justice Rehnquist further refined his own views on just compen-
sation doctrine in the second significant opinion by the Court in 1987, First
English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Ange-
les.'5 ' The Lutheran Church had purchased a twenty-one acre tract of land
along the banks of the Middle Fork of Mill Creek in Mill Creek Canyon.
The church established a campground known as "Lutherglen" on the site,
which is in the mountains about 25 miles north of Los Angeles. The church
used the facilities as a recreational area for handicapped children and as a
retreat for church members. The area was subject to flash floods, a problem
that was magnified by a fire in 1977 which denuded the hills upstream. As
a result, serious flooding in 1978 destroyed all of the buildings at Luther-
glen, including a dining hall, two bunk houses, a caretaker's lodge and an
owner possesses a full 'bundle' of property rights, the destruction of one 'strand' of the bundle
is not a taking because the aggregate must be viewed in its entirety.").
146. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n, 480 U.S. at 518 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
147. Id. at 518-20.
148. Id. at 520.
149. Id. at 516.
150. Id. at 513.
151. 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987).




In response to the disaster, the County of Los Angeles adopted an in-
terim flood protection ordinance which included the area on which Luther-
glen had stood. The measure temporarily prohibited construction in this
area because the county board believed that prohibition was urgently "re-
quired for the immediate preservation of the public health and safety."'5
The church immediately filed a complaint in California state court assert-
ing that these regulations amounted to a taking of its property, but it was
dismissed when the California court decided that a landowner may not
maintain an inverse condemnation suit based upon a "regulatory" taking.
In reviewing the California court's decision, the Supreme Court held
"that where the government's activities have already worked a taking of all
use of property, no subsequent action by the government can relieve it of
the duty to provide compensation for the period during which the taking
was effective."'153 The Court did not decide whether the ordinance at issue
had actually denied the church all use of its property or indeed whether the
ordinance could be justified as a proper police power measure. But the deci-
sion was nevertheless an important one, for it firmly established that mone-
tary damages are the preferred remedy for inverse condemnation actions
under the federal Constitution.
Justice Stevens, in dissent, asserted that the majority distorted the
meaning of prior takings cases. In portions of his dissenting opinion which
were joined by Justices Blackmun and O'Connor, Stevens argued first that
the interim flood protection ordinance could not as a matter of law amount
to a taking of the church property.'5 Such health and safety regulations
are traditional justifications for police power measures, and the church did
not marshall any facts which would rebut the normal presumption of valid-
ity of the regulation. Second, Justice Stevens concluded that the church
should be required to pursue an action demanding invalidation of the ordi-
nance in the California courts prior to seeking Supreme Court review of
state procedures. 55
The third significant takings case came at the end of the 1986-87 term
in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission.' The Nollans bought beach-
front property in Ventura County, California. They wanted to demolish the
bungalow on the lot and replace it with a more substantial three-bedroom
home. The California Coastal Commission, however, found that the new
house would increase blockage of the view of the ocean, and thus might
152. Id. at 2382.
153. Id. at 2389.
154. Id. at 2391-32 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
155. Id. at 2396-98.
156. 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987).
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leave some members of the public with the false impression that the beach
is wholely private. Consequently, the Commission indicated that it would
grant permission to rebuild the home only if the Nollans would provide the
public with an easement to pass across a portion of their property adjacent
to the ocean. This easement would assure access to public beaches near the
Nollan lot. The Nollans argued that this constituted an outright taking of
their property, and the United States Supreme Court agreed.
Justice Scalia, writing for a majority which included the Chief Justice
and Justices White, Powell, and O'Connor, held that the condition
amounted to a "permanent physical occupation" of the Nollans' prop-
erty.1 57 The Court concluded that the Commission's assumed power to for-
bid construction of the house in order to protect the public's view of the
beach would include the power to condition construction of the home sub-
ject to the requirement that the Nollans provide a viewing spot on their
property for passersby. Here, however, the condition to provide lateral ac-
cess across their property had nothing to do with the Commission's power
to limit construction. Thus, this particular land use regulation did not sub-
stantially advance the legitimate state interest in protecting the public's
view of the beach and it must be invalidated. This conclusion is mandated,
the Court suggested, whenever a condition does not reasonably relate to the
public need or burden that the proposed construction creates or to which it
contributes. 158
Justice Brennan, in his dissent, argued that this case should be decided
along the lines suggested by his Penn Central decision. The first question is:
Is the regulatory activity a proper exercise of the police power? He answers
this question by noting that the police power of the states encompasses the
authority to impose conditions on private development. 59 In this case, Cali-
fornia used its police power to condition the beachfront development upon
preservation of public access to the ocean beach. This is a legitimate public
purpose, Brennan contends, and under the traditionally deferential scope of
review on such questions, the state could not be said to have acted
irrationally. 60
Assuming this constitutes a legitimate police power activity, Justice
Brennan asserted that we must then proceed to question whether the regu-
lation goes too far.'6 ' He considered the physical intrusion here minimal
because even without the permit condition, the public's recognized right of
157. Id. at 3145.
158. Id. at 3147-48.
159. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 3151 (1987) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
160. Id. at 3153-54.
161. Id. at 3156.
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access permits it to pass within a few feet of the Nollans' seawall.162 Thus,
the requirement is not unlike the required dedication of a sidewalk in front
of a private residence. This requirement also does not result in any signifi-
cant impairment of the value of the land and the owners can make no rea-
sonable claim to any prior investment-backed expectations of being able to
exclude members of the public from crossing the edge of their property to
gain access to the ocean.1 13 Indeed, Justice Brennan concluded, the Nollans
are both burdened and benefited by the Coastal Commission's permit condi-
tion program because they are able to walk along the beach beyond the
confines of their own property over neighboring land on which the Commis-
sion had required similar deed restrictions.'"
B. A Brief Critique
Justice Brennan's dissent in Nollan does raise as a legitimate question
whether the Rehnquist Court has strayed considerably from the analytical
mode the Burger Court adopted in the Penn Central case. Justice Brennan,
for example, took issue with the majority in Nollan for that Court's deter-
mination to raise the standard of review in takings cases to some higher
level of scrutiny. The majority, through Justice Scalia, held that regulations
must "substantially advance" the legitimate "state interest" sought to be
achieved in order to pass constitutional muster. 65 The Court then pro-
ceeded to examine both the legitimacy of the public purposes suggested on
behalf of the law and the fit between these purposes and the means chosen
by the California Coastal Commission to implement it.'66 Commentators
have noted that this is a new, more stringent standard for regulatory mea-
sures. 67 But Justice Scalia cited for support of that proposition both Agins
and Justice Brennan's own opinion in Penn Central ("a use restriction may
constitute a 'taking' if not reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a sub-
162. Id. at 3156-57.
163. Id. at 3158-60.
164. Id. at 3158.
165. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 3146 (1987).
166. Id. at 3147-50.
167. See, e.g., Falik & Shimko, The "Takings" Nexus-The Supreme Court Chooses a
New Direction in Land-Use Planning: A View From California, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 359, 390-92
(1988); Humbach, Economic Due Process and the Takings Clause, 4 PACE ENVTL. L. REV.
311, 346-47 (1987); Karlin, Back to the Future: From Nollan to Lochner, 17 Sw. U.L. REV.
627, 629-31 (1988); Siemon & Larsen, The Taking Issue Trilogy: The Beginning of the End?
33 WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 169, 194 (1988). Cf. Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88
COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1608-14 (1988) (arguing that the heightened scrutiny of Nollan may
only apply in cases where the challenged regulation has the effect of imposing a permanent
physical occupation on a landowner). Professor Michelman's article is the principal paper in a
collection of essays reviewing the 1987 takings cases. See The Jurisprudence of Takings, 88
COLUM. L. Rev. 1581 (1988).
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stantial government purpose"). 6 8
Justice Brennan responded by saying that that is not what he said, or
at least, that is not what he meant.1 9 Yet the very nature of legal argument
makes the definitive treatment of precedent problematic. It is true that
many of the prior cases demonstrate an exceedingly deferential mindset on
the part of the Court, as my previous discussion of the Penn Central case
reveals.170 But one can trace through Nollan and Agins to find the Supreme
Court's 1928 decision, Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 7 at the root of this
standard. This decision invalidated one of the early attempts at zoning be-
cause of the city's inofficious line-drawing. Nectow has been, and continues
to be, one of the Court's most opaque zoning opinions.' 1 It could arguably
stand for the proposition that a higher degree of scrutiny attends some reg-
ulatory takings circumstances.
The problem is that the ruling in Nollan is not clear as to when the
heightened scrutiny is in order. Will it apply only in subdivision exaction
cases, as the facts of Nollan might suggest? Or perhaps only in cases in-
volving "permanent physical occupations," as the holding in the case sug-
gests? Or will it apply to all regulatory takings cases, as the cases cited in
Nollan might suggest? The decision is confusing on this point, and there
seems to be little justification for this uncertainty. A forthright analysis of
the circumstances and policies justifying an enhanced judicial role is essen-
tial for both applying the standard in future cases and in analyzing the
merits of the Court's analysis. As Professor Shapiro reminds us,
"[R]easoned response to reasoned argument is an essential aspect of [the
judicial] process. A requirement that judges give reasons for their deci-
sions-grounds of decision that can be debated, attacked, and de-
fended-serves a vital function in constraining the judiciary's exercise of
168. See Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3146 (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City,
438 U.S. 104, 127 (1978)).
169. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3152 n.1 ("Our phraseology may differ slightly from case to
case-e.g., regulation must 'substantially advance,' Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260,
(1980) [citations omitted] or be 'reasonably necessary to' Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York
City, 438 U.S. 104, 127, (1978) [citations omitted] the government's end. These minor differ-
ences cannot, however, obscure the fact that the inquiry in each case is the same.") (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
170. See supra text accompanying notes 59-66.
171. 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
172. Commentators have seen in this opinion much that is relevant to modern compen-
sation doctrinal debate. Professor Ellickson criticized the opinion for creating what he called
the "Nectow fallacy" that a landowner's sole remedy for overrestrictive zoning classifications is
injunctive relief and not damages. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and
Legal Analysis, 86 YALE LJ. 385, 490-93 (1977). Professor Berger saw in the opinion the
origin of the "reasonable beneficial return" standard for determining when a zoning law be-
comes constitutionally unacceptable. Berger, The Accommodation Power in Land Use Contro-
versies: A Reply to Professor Costonis, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 817 (1976).




Nor should one feel inhibited in asking the Court to provide explicit
reasons and justifications for its decision in Nollan because that is in es-
sence what the Court is demanding from the California Coastal Commis-
sion. The Commission was, in the Court's view, guilty of being disengenu-
ous. You cannot tell us that you want to protect the ocean view for
passersby, says the Court, and then allow the Nollans to build a home de-
stroying that view provided they grant lateral access to the public beaches.
In a sense, state and local governments have been imposed with an obliga-
tion of candor in their development permit programs. And ostensibly this
requirement is imposed for reasons similar to the imposition of an obliga-
tion for candor in the judicial process. It serves a checking function. The
limitations imposed by statutes or constitutions will prove ineffective if mu-
nicipalities are allowed to use implausible justifications for their regulatory
activities. This check is necessary both to enhance the effectiveness of judi-
cial review and perhaps to reduce the degree of cynicism about public deci-
sion making that would result if regulators are, by either deception or eva-
sion, not accountable for their decisions.
This checking function is also implicit in the First English case. The
decision adds little to the development of doctrine on the difficult question
of when one can confidently predict that a taking has occurred. But the
decision on remedies is obviously designed to inhibit the abuse of municipal
authority by allowing for damages in times of even temporary overreaching.
"We realize that even our present holding will undoubtedly lessen to some
extent the freedom and flexibility of land use planners and governing bodies
of municipal corporations when enacting land use regulations," says the
Court, "[b]ut such consequences necessarily flow from any decision uphold-
ing a claim of constitutional right. .. .
Chief Justice Rehnquist seems to have the gift of understatement. Ac-
ademic and judicial debate on the question of compensation for regulatory
takings has been intense since Justice Brennan suggested the idea in
1981.171 Justice Stevens in his dissent in First English captures the prevail-
173. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REv. 731, 737 (1987) (foot-
notes omitted).
174. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 107 S. Ct.
2378, 2389 (1987).
175. Justice Brennan first suggested the mandatory damage rule in his San Diego dis-
sent. See San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 658 (1981) (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting). Academic debate on the subject began in earnest soon after that decision.
Compare, e.g., Johnson, Compensation for Invalid Land-Use.Regulations, 15 GA. L. REv. 559
(1981) (arguing against compensation) with Cunningham, Inverse Condemnation as a Rem-
edyfor "Regulatory Takings," 8 HASTINGS CoNsT. L.Q. 517 (1981). For a more recent, spir-
ited debate on the same issue, compare Williams, Smith, Siemon, Mandelker & Babcock, The
White River Junction Manifesto, 9 VT. L. REv. 193 (1984) (arguing against compensation)
1989] 549
Myers: Some Observations on the Analysis of Regulatory Takings in the Re
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1989
550 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23
ing sentiment of the critics to such a rule-regulators will be so intimidated
by the sanction of monetary damages that they will refrain from enacting
legitimate land use schemes for fear of crossing the threshold level of con-
stitutional invalidity.1 7 6
My own view on the issue of damages for regulating takings is that the
Court's decision was simply too absolute in nature. I take my queue here
from Professor Paul Freund who, in 1975, critically reviewed the significant
decisions of the Warren Court in the areas of voting rights, first amend-
ment, equal protection and criminal law.1 1 He was, to be sure, generally
favorable to these developments, but he questioned the wisdom of "impos-
ing absolute or exclusive sanctions to achieve constitutional ends."' 78 For
example, he criticized the exclusionary rule as the single instrumental rule
for unreasonable searches and seizures. Allowing a discretionary rule cou-
pled with a right of action for damages against the state, he surmised,
might provide a better accommodation between the search for truth and
unlawful police conduct. 17 9 To take another example, in New York Times v.
Sullivan,8" the Court adopted a single standard of liability regarding the
defamation of public officials. Professor Freund urged a constitutional guar-
antee that might allow for a range of alternatives rather than a single in-
strumental rule.'"" Although the Court has remained faithful to the New
York Times standard in cases involving public officials or public figures, it
now allows for greater experimentation by the states where the speech con-
cerns private individuals' 82 or private matters. 18 The greater flexibility is
frank recognition of the fact that there may be several effective means for
balancing between first amendment considerations and the need to protect
reputation interests.
with Berger & Kanner, Thoughts on The White River Junction Manifesto: A Reply to the
"Gang of Five's" Views on Just Compensation for Regulatory Taking of Property, 19 LoY.
L.A.L. REv. 685 (1986).
176. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2399-2400 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
177. Freund, The Judicial Process in Civil Liberties Cases, 1975 U. ILL. L. FORUM 493.
178. Id. at 500. Professor Freund explains:
The decisions were absolute in the sense that they characteristically mandated one and
only one means of complying with a constitutional guarantee that does not itself prescribe
a particular solution or sanction to satisfy the guarantee. If the Court decides that a state
law or practice cannot be squared with the Constitution, the question remains whether
the Court will indicate a range of valid solutions or will specify an exclusive means to
satisfy the constitutional objective.
Id. at 497.
179. Id. at 499.
180. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
181. Freund, supra note 177, at 498-99.
182. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
183. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985) (plu-
rality opinion).
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 23, No. 3 [1989], Art. 8
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol23/iss3/8
REGULATORY TAKINGS
The Supreme Court could follow a similar pattern in the context of
regulatory takings. The absolute rule on damages may be confined to
"physical occupation" cases, for example, while the states may be allowed
to experiment with remedies for other types of interferences with property
interests as long as base limitations are provided. The problem is that the
question of damages is not an easy one, for landowners may be left with an
insufficient remedy if they are uniformly denied, and cities may be unduly
intimidated if they are uniformly allowed. But the advantages of allowing
alternative legislative measures seems to me a wiser accommodation of the
competing interests at stake.
By far the most important case of the 1986-87 Term, for analytical
purposes, is the Keystone case. Justice Stevens, writing for the majority,
took such extreme efforts to cabin the force of Holmes' opinion in Pennsyl-
vania Coal Co. v. Mahon that some observers have said it is tantamount to
overruling that decision.18' But for me the more interesting fact is the basic
difference in approach between the majority and dissenting opinions. Justice
Stevens focused almost exclusively on the character of the governmental
interest under review in order to test the law's validity. The dissent, on the
other hand, focused almost exclusively on the impact of the law from the
viewpoint of the landowner's interests.
In my opinion, this case reveals a fundamental difference in reasoning
styles. The Chief Justice follows a traditional, formalistic approach for re-
viewing the constitutionality of the statute. Formalism, to borrow Judge
Posner's definition, means the "use of deductive logic to derive the outcome
of a case from premises accepted as authoritative."' 85 What premises are at
work here? First, conventional perceptions of property rights are a primary
focus. Common law distributions of rights in land are accepted as natural
and legislative decisions to alter these rights are viewed with suspicion. The
constitutional text speaks plainly on this point, and broad policy concerns
are not germane to the issue. The coal companies were "taken" here, and
the proffered justifications simply do not measure up.
Justice Stevens, on the other hand, takes what might be considered a
functionalist, nontraditional approach to the issue. "In general terms, func-
tional approaches examine whether present practices undermine constitu-
tional commitments that should be regarded as central."' 88 In the context
184. See, e.g., Clarke, Regulatory Takings, Laissez Faire and Two Coal Cases From
Pennsylvania, 13 OKLA. CiTy U.L. REV. 37 (1988); Large, The Supreme Court and the Tak-
ings Clause: The Search for a Better Rule, 18 ENVTL. L. 3, 35 (1987).
185. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and
the Constitution, 37 CASE W. Ras. L. REV. 179, 181 (1986). Formalism is experiencing some-
thing of a renaissance. See, e.g., Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of
Law, 97 YALE L.J. 949 (1988).
186. Sunstein, Constitutionalism after the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REv. 421, 495
19891
Myers: Some Observations on the Analysis of Regulatory Takings in the Re
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1989
552 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23
of regulatory takings, this approach centers on the nature of the public ac-
tivity under review. It allows for policy considerations to illuminate the text
of the Constitution and it demands a fair degree of deference to legislative
enactments. This approach also does not view existing perceptions of prop-
erty as sacrosanct. This sentiment was adequately captured by Justice
Blackmun, in his dissenting opinion in Loretto: "[T]his Court long ago rec-
ognized that new social circumstances can justify legislative modification of
a property owner's common-law rights, without compensation, if the legisla-
tive action serves sufficiently important public interests."'187
Now I realize that I have taken liberties with these caricatures. Impor-
tant assumptions on the nature of judicial review, the interpretation of legal
texts, and the role of the framer's intent in analyzing contemporary consti-
tutional issues are all brought into play with such sweeping generalizations.
But my goal is to describe the reasons for the Court's vacillating images in
the regulatory takings cases, and such broad profiles are essential to that
task.
For example, this description of formalism describes well the position
of the Court in the First English case. The Constitution permits no discus-
sion of policy on the question of damages. If "property" has been "taken,"
compensation must be paid. A municipality's action is either correct or in-
correct; the test is rather simple.
This reasoning is also implicit in Justice Scalia's opinion in Nollan, at
least in one crucial respect. The enhanced means-end scrutiny suggested by
the Court is reminiscent of the Lochner-era decisions searching for some
"neutral" justifications of police power initiatives.188 This was the period in
the Court's history (1905-37) when the common law served as a baseline
for questions of constitutional legitimacy. 89 The Court questioned proposed
regulations by examining the "means" used to effectuate a legitimate gov-
ernmental objective. In reality, this test allowed the Court to question the
governmental objective itself. There can be no plausible justification
(means) for an implausible objective (ends). In the Nollan case, the Court
held that common law conceptions of property (here the easement for ac-
cess) should not be considered subject to social reordering simply because
the California Coastal Commission believes the public interest will be
served by a continuous strip of publicly accessible beach along the coast.
This objective can only be accomplished by the exercise of eminent domain
(1987).
187. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 454 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting).
188. See generally Williams, Legal Discourse, Social Vision and the Supreme Court's
Land Use Planning Law: The Genealogy of the "Lochnerian" Recurrence in "First English
Lutheran Church" and "Nollan," 59 U. CoLo. L. REv. 427 (1988).
189. See generally Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 873 (1987).




If one agrees with these portrayals, then an interesting line-up in the
various factions appears in the Court's 1987 decisions. This assumes that
the majority opinions in Nollan and First English and the dissent in Key-
stone are all predominantly formalistic, while the majority opinion in Key-
stone and the dissenting opinions in First English and Nollan are predomi-
nantly functionalistic in nature. Under this assumption, Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Scalia consistently follow the formalist's approach.
Justices Stevens and Blackmun, on the other hand, appear consistently to
follow the functional approach. Four of the current sitting Justices-White,
O'Connor, Brennan and Marshall-appear to want to have it both ways.
Although this ambivalence may sound a bit surprising, a similar phenome-
non has been observed by Professor Strauss in his study on the separation of
190. Rent control under some circumstances also violates this "nexus" requirement for
Justice Scalia. Specifically, when rent control is used to effectuate a price wealth transfer from
landlords to tenants, Justice Scalia asserts that taxation is the appropriate legislative response,
not a police power measure. See Pennell v. City of San Jose, 108 S. Ct. 849, 863-64 (1988)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
In Pennell, the Court faced a challenge to San Jose's rent control ordinance which allows
a hearing officer to consider the economic "hardship" to a tenant when determining whether to
approve a proposed rent increase. The majority concluded that it was premature to consider
the asserted takings claim because the ordinance did not require that a hearing officer reduce a
proposed rent increase because of tenant hardship and because no concrete harm had been
shown by the petitioner. Id. at 856-57. The Court did entertain, but rejected, facial challenges
to the ordinance under the fourteenth amendment due process and equal protection clauses. Id.
at 857-59.
Justice Scalia dissented from the holding that the takings claim was premature. In an
opinion joined by Justice O'Connor, he argued that the ordinance did not substantially ad-
vance legitimate state interests. Thus, in his view, the Court was being called upon to once
again determine if there was an appropriate nexus between the state interest involved and the
means used to promote or effectuate that interest. He concluded that providing financial assis-
tance to hardship tenants is not a state interest that can be legitimately furthered by regulat-
ing the use of property. Id. at 859-64 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Significantly, for our purposes, Justice Scalia elaborated on the "nexus" requirement for
ordinances challenged under the takings clause:
Traditional land-use regulation (short of that which totally destroys the economic
value of property) does not violate this principle because there is a cause-and-effect rela-
tionship between the property use restricted by the regulation and the social evil that the
regulation seeks to remedy. Since the owner's use of the property is (or, but for the
regulation, would be) the source of the social problem, it cannot be said that he has been
singled out unfairly. Thus, the common zoning regulations requiring subdividers to ob-
serve lot-size and set-back restrictions, and to dedicate certain areas to public streets, are
in accord with our constitutional traditions because the proposed property use would oth-
erwise be the cause of excessive congestion.
Id. at 862 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In Justice Scalia's view, the ordinance in Pennell did not
satisfy the cause-and-effect test because landlords cannot be said to have caused the more
general problem that the "hardship" provision was designed to meet: the existence of some
renters who are too poor to afford even reasonably priced housing.
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powers question."9'
This may help to explain the unpredictable nature of the Court's regu-
latory takings cases. But what can explain the apparent inconsistency
within the group of uncommitted Justices? A possible explanation is that
this particular faction follows an alternative, compromise approach. This
approach focuses more particularly on the function the takings clause can
perform in mediating between the conflicting concepts of police power and
private property than it does on textual interpretation or historical justifica-
tion for the various theories of just compensation law. A clue here might be
Agins v. City of Tiburon' where the Court, through Justice Powell,
frankly admitted that the takings question "necessarily requires a weighing
of private and public interests."' 93 The decision is neither formalistic nor
functional as I have tried to define these terms. The opinion simply makes
no choice. Significantly, it was a unanimous decision.
The attempt here to manage competing constitutional values through
constitutional balancing is what I think gives rise to the appearance of am-
bivalence within this group of Justices.' But commentators have ably
demonstrated that a candid perception of the underlying tensions in this
area of the law will reveal how difficult it is to bind these concerns into
some guiding, unitary theory for the takings clause. Professor John Costonis
described the tension as a conflict between the "welfare" principles of the
police power and the "indemnity" principles of the eminent domain
power. 19 Professor Carol Rose defined the problem as a continuing tension
191. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers Ques-
tions-A Foolish Inconsistency? 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488, 489 (1987). Professor Strauss does
not define formal and functional approaches to the separation of powers question in the same
manner that I have defined the two approaches here, and indeed this fact points up one of the
problems with using such well-worn terms in varying contexts. See also Schauer, Formalism,
97 YALE L.J. 509, 509-10 (1988) (discussing the widely divergent uses of the term "formal-
ism"). But I cite to the study of Professor Strauss because I think his method of defining and
analyzing the different reasoning styles used by various Justices is a useful way to explore
those areas of the law plagued by seemingly inconsistent rulings from the Court.
192. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
193. Id. at 261.
194. See also Ross, Modeling and Formalism in Takings Jurisprudence, 61 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 372, 399-406 (1986) (describing the ambivalence in terms of differences in
decisional frameworks that individual Justices bring to the takings cases).
195. Costonis, supra note 108, at 478.
The police and eminent domain powers are anchored in value premises, termed here
the welfare and indemnity principles, that frequently function at cross purposes. Through
the welfare principle, the police power deliberately envisages the redistribution of utility,
often in the form of recognized interests in real property, as a means of furthering the
community's "health, safety, morals, or general welfare." Substantively open-ended and
therefore uncabinable by present standards, the power sweeps as widely as government's
inherent legislative power. The eminent domain power, through its indemnity principle,
cuts the other way: its charge is protection of the individual, not the community, by
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between the "Lockean/Madisonian/Benthamite argument for acquisition"
of property, and the "civil conception of property as a means of developing
character and promoting republican participation. '196 Over fifty years ago,
Professor Francis Philbrick summarized the conflict simply as a contrast
between those looking to individualism to save society and those looking to
society to save the individual.19 7 With such high stakes, balancing, flawed
though it may be, seems for these Justices perhaps to be the most appropri-
ate technique for constitutional adjudication.
In summary, then, one of the essential conflicts in the analysis of regu-
latory takings in the Rehnquist Court involves a difference in the reasoning
making the individual whole in the wake of governmental acts that redistribute his or her
property rights to others.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
196. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why The Takings Issue is Still a Muddle, 57 S.
CAL. L. REV. 561, 593 (1984). Professor Rose explains:
Takings jurisprudence uses two quite divergent vocabularies, each reflecting one of
the two divergent concepts of property. The takings dilemma is thus not simply a confu-
sion over legal terms, to be solved by adopting scientific policy. Like the dilemma over
state action, the takings dilemma is a legal manifestation of a much deeper cultural and
political argument about the civic nature of what Holmes would have called the "human
animal."
This impasse is particularly unfortunate because both views of property have consid-
erable commonsensible appeal. The argument for protecting acquisitiveness rests on the
intuitive propositions that human beings act to further their own material well-being, that
it is fruitless to attempt to suppress this characteristic entirely, and that the ability of
individuals to act in their own best interest may have substantial social benefits. The civic
argument rests on the equally intuitive propositions that any community-including one
that protects private property-must rely on some moral qualities of public spiritedness
and mutual forbearance in its individual members to bond the community together, and
that a democracy may be particularly dependent on these qualities because it relies not
on force, but on voluntary compliance with the norms of the community.
Id. at 596 (footnotes omitted).
197. Philbrick, Changing Conceptions of Property in Law, 86 U. PA. L. REv. 691, 728-
29 (1938). Again, to place this observation in its context, Professor Philbrick states:
Manifestly we need a modernized philosophy of property. No mere philosophy of
words or aspirations, however. In that respect the contrast between Mill and Comte-one
looking to individualism to save society, the other to society to save the individual-is
precisely the same as that which existed between Aristotle and Plato. The first tenet of an
adequate philosophy must be that property is the creature and dependent of law, includ-
ing, of course, our constitutions-surely no radical doctrine! On one hand, private prop-
erty, though admitting that it can only exist by virtue of public protection, pleads pay-
ment of taxes as the whole price of that protection, and beyond that claims immunity
from all social obligations. On the other hand, the thought of the world for two genera-
tions has been tending toward collective Utopias.
Id. (footnotes omitted). Professor Philbrick's remarks were not focused on the just compensa-
tion clause and indeed are more readily considered as part of a general discussion of property
jurisprudence. Nevertheless, his seminal article provides a good deal of insight into the particu-
lar values that are implicated in any discussion of land use and constitutional imperatives. See
generally Cribbet, Changing Concepts in the Law of Land Use, 50 IowA L. REv. 245 (1965).
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styles exhibited by a fluctuating majority of the Justices. One faction fol-
lows a traditional, formalistic approach which favors conventional percep-
tions of property rights. Another faction follows a functionalist approach
which centers on the nature of the public activity under review and allows a
fair degree of deference to legislative enactments. A third group adopts a
loosely constructed balancing test to mediate between the sometime con-
flicting concepts of police power and private property. Recent cases have
been decided by majorities comprised of various combinations of the these
constituencies.99
But this analysis does not fully explain the inconsistencies in the
Court's 1987 takings cases. It does not, for example, explain the inconsis-
tent approaches of Justice Brennan and Justice Stevens. Both are essen-
tially functionalists in their analyses of regulatory takings. 99 Yet Justice
Brennan cast a key vote in the First English case,200 in which the Court
adopted monetary damages as the sole remedy for temporary regulatory
takings. His position in this case is by my description formal in nature.
It is possible to explain this ambivalence by suggesting that Justice
Brennan viewed the issue in First English as an exceedingly narrow one: If
the Court finds a taking, should compensation be paid? The answer for
198. To recapitulate, here is a summary of the votes on the takings cases of the 1986-87
Term:
Keystone First English Nollan






Dissent Rehnquist Stevens Brennan
O'Connor Blackmun (in part) Marshall
Powell O'Connor (in part) Blackmun (separate opinion)
Scalia Stevens (separate opinion)
Interestingly, Justice Powell sided with Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia in all
three cases. Because he did not author an opinion of his own, it is uncertain whether he re-
jected the mode of analysis he adopted in the Agins decision for the more formal analytical
approach.
199. See Justice Stevens' majority opinion in Keystone Bituminois Coal Ass'n v. De-
Benedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987), and his dissent in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church
of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 107 S. Ct. 2378, 2389 (1987) (Stevens, J. dissenting).
Justice Brennan's functional approach is set out in his dissenting opinion in Nollan v. Califor-
nia Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 3150 (Brennan, J., dissenting) and his majority opinion
in Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979). Note in regard to the Andrus decision that Justice
Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist have begun to argue that Andrus should be strictly limited
to its facts. See Hodel v. Irving, 107 S. Ct. 2076, 2084-85 (1987) (Scalia, J., joined by Rehn-
quist, C. J., & Powell, J., concurring).
200. First English, 107 S. Ct. 2378.
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Justice Brennan is yes. If you transcend police power limitations, you must
pay for the constitutional error. But to determine when the constitutional
violation occurs, Justice Brennan will use a functional analysis: "I believe
that States should be afforded considerable latitude in regulating private
development, without fear that their regulatory efforts will often be found
to constitute a taking. '201 Thus, Justice Brennan may have been attempting
to recast the compromise he struck in the Penn Central case in a different
mold. Instead of vacillating between formal and functional approaches, he
has firmly adopted the latter as the appropriate mode of analysis for regula-
tory takings. But should a violation occur under a functional analysis of a
dispute, then compensation must be paid, and this is required by the fifth
amendment's takings clause.
The problem is that in the Nollan decision a majority of the Court
rejected this approach. This is, perhaps, one of the most important aspects
of the Nollan opinion. In that decision, the Court rejected the functional
approach that Justice Brennan was advocating for resolving the substantive
issue as to when the "take" occurs. If Nollan is read expansively to em-
brace a large number of "takings" scenarios, it would foreshadow the end
of Penn Central's deferential approach to legislative restrictions on land
use. The Nollan opinion, coupled with the damages remedy sanctioned by
the Court in the First English case, could well subject the actions of state
and local governments to severe scrutiny by federal and state courts. 02
Set against the likelihood of this happening, in a rather determined
way, is Justice Stevens' majority opinion in Keystone. That decision is cast
in functional terms and even opens the door to a reexamination of the
proper office of the diminution-in-value test for regulatory takings. Some
regulatory measures, such as anti-nuisance ordinances, may avoid conven-
tional takings analysis altogether if the Court is persuaded that a suffi-
ciently weighty, non-discriminitory purpose is the motivating factor behind
the legislation.203 Should this opinion be read expansively, the Court's role
in supervising errant local governments could be circumscribed signifi-
cantly. Thus, to a generous extent, the inarticulated balance between for-
mal and functional approaches to the taking issue adopted by the Court in
the Penn Central case remains unchanged. It may be ironic that Justice
Stevens is primarily responsible for this. After all, he joined then-Justice
Rehnquist's dissent in Penn Central. But one gets the sense that the Jus-
201. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3162 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
202. For commentary suggesting the development of takings doctrine along these lines,
see Epstein, Takings: Descent and Resurrection, 1987 Sup. CT. REV. 1. But cf. Note, Taking
a Step Back. A Reconsideration of the Takings Test of Nollan v. California Coastal Commis-
sion, 102 HARV. L. REV. 448 (1988) (advocating a narrow reading of the Nollan opinion).
203. The opinion is admittedly ambiguous on this point. See Michelman, Takings, 1987,
88 COLUm. L. REV. 1600, 1604 n.19 (1988).
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tices individually are evolving in their own analyses of regulatory takings as
the Court takes on an increasing number of challenges to state and local
government initiatives. Whether any of the major developments discussed in
this Article will coalesce into a coherent theory for the takings clause, or at
least into a view that will consistently garner a majority of the Justices,
remains to be seen.
CONCLUSION
Anyone who analyzes the taking issue comes to appreciate that it in-
volves a clash of deeply felt and basic constitutional values. Moreover, there
is no clear consensus on the issue. In such instances, judges may work to
find a solution that avoids exalting one of the competing sets of values at
the expense of the other.2 '
This is what I think the Court was doing in the Penn Central case.
That may explain why it is so difficult to understand. Penn Central was a
composite of constitutional approaches to the taking issue. The Court uti-
lized both functional and formalistic approaches to resolve the dispute with-
out fully recognizing the inconsistent nature of these approaches. But in so
doing it accomplished a compromise. In recent cases the particular
rules-on damages, on scope of review, and on the proper office of the dimi-
nution-in-value test-may have been changed. But the essential com-
promises of the Penn Central case-between formalistic and functional ap-
proaches, between those looking to individualism to save society and those
looking to society to save the individual-remain intact.
204. See the fitting tribute to Justice Powell by Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Tribute to
Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., 101 HARV. L. REV. 399, 402 (1987).
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